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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
upon the single recovery by the infant passenger, if it is shown
that defendant vigorously litigated that case. Such a result would
be difficult to justify either in logic or in law.
The Court of Appeals cannot be charged with intending such
a broad construction of its holding. What it intended, apparently,
was to establish the principle that, given a proper situation, a
plaintiff could have the benefit of collateral estoppel. What will
constitute such a proper case must be left to the wisdom of the
lower courts and to future decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Collateral Estoppel: Defensive assertion of collateral estoppel.
The question of when to allow the defense of collateral estoppel
is still far from a definitive answer in New York, especially with
regard to its use by joint tortfeasors. Two recent cases, MacGilfrey
v. Hotaling94 and Terwilliger v. Terwilliger"9 turned upon this
question.
Both cases involved automobile accidents and presented similar
factual situations. In each, P , (passenger in car number one)
sued D r (driver of car number one) and D, (driver of car
number two) for negligence, and recovered against both drivers.
In a subsequent suit, D , sued D,,, and D sought to invoke the
defense of collateral estoppel, i.e., since D 1 was found negligent
as to P 1 he should be estopped to deny his contributory negligence
as to his own injuries arising from the same accident. In each
case, the court refused to allow the defense.
Glaser v. Huette 96 established the rule in New York that
prevented the defensive use of collateral estoppel in a subsequent
action between parties who were codefendants in a prior action.
The Glaser court reasoned that since the parties to the second
action were not adversaries in the first action, there was no duty
to defend against each. other in the first action, and, therefore, they
could relitigate the issue of negligence as between themselves.
Subsequent to the Glaser decision, the Court of Appeals
abolished technical requirements as to the defensive use of collateral
estoppel, and established the rule that it could be used when the
issues were identical and when the party against whom the defense
was being asserted had had his day in court on the issue.9 7  How-
ever, in cases involving joint tortfeasors, New York courts, includ-
ing the Court of Appeals, have continued to follow the Glaser rule
without considering whether the "identity of issues plus opportunity
9426 App. Div. 2d 977, 274 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dep't 1966).
95 52 Misc. 2d 404, 276 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1966).
96232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y. Supp. 374 (1st Dep't), aff'd twin., 256
N.Y. 686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931).
97 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1956).
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to be heard" test had been satisfied'8 A recent decision by the
Court of Appeals, Cummnings z. Dresher9 has been seen by some
as changing the Glaser doctrine in this area.
Cumnings presented a slightly different situation than that in
Glaser, MacGilfrey, and Terwilliger. In Cuwmmings, the first action
involved a suit by P , and D , against D 2. P z recovered, but
D, lost, as the jury found him guilty of contributory negligence.
However, the jury also made a gratuitous finding that D 2 was
guilty of negligence to D . In a subsequent action by D 2 against
D 1, the Court allowed D , to interpose the defense of collateral
estoppel, i.e., that the finding, in the prior action, that D 2 was
negligent established his contributory negligence in this action.
The Court reasoned that where the issues are the same and both
litigants were parties to the first action, there is no reason to
relitigate the issues.
The decision does not indicate why the Court concluded that
the issue of D 2's contributory negligence had been settled in the
suit by P 1. However, there are two possible reasons. One reason
could be the gratuitous finding of the jury in the first action that
D 2 was negligent as to D . However, there are several reasons
for rejecting this possibility: (1) if a jury returned a general
verdict, without volunteering to tell the court why it reached its
verdict, D 2 would not have been foreclosed from bringing suit.
Such a consequence should "not be left to hang on this kind of
fortuity;" "00 (2) a jury might not put as much time and thought
into deliberating an issue, D 's negligence for example, when the
result would have no practical effect due to a prior determination
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent; (3) precedent weighs
against giving such conclusiveness to a voluntary finding by a
jury.101
If the gratuitous finding in the prior case is eliminated, the
ratio decidendi in Cummings must be the finding of the jury that
D 2 was negligent as to P , and therefore was negligent as to D
as well. This seems a more cogent argument, since it is hard (or
impossible) to visualize a situation where a person could drive
negligently in relation to a passenger in another car, and be non-
9s E.g., Minkoff v. Brenner, 10 N.Y.2d 1030, 180 N.E.2d 434, 225 N.Y.S.2d
47 (1962); Grande v. Torello, 12 App. Div. 2d 937, 210 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d
Dep't 1961): Friedman v. Salvati, 11 App. Div. 2d 104, 201 N.Y.S.2d 709
(1st Dep't 1960).
99 1 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
100 Cummings v. Dresher, id. at 113, 218 N.E.2d at 693, 271 N.Y.S.2d at
932 (dissenting opinion).
101 Purpora v. Coney Island Dairy Prods. Corp., 262 App. Div. 908, 28
N.Y.S.2d 1008 (2d Dep't 1941). See The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, 41 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 121, 150 (1966).
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negligent as to its driver. The issues are identical, and D , had
his day in court on the issue in his defense against P 1. If this
is so, of what necessity is it to the decision that D i was also
involved as a plaintiff in the prior action? It would seem to be
completely extraneous. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
that even if the first action were merely P , against D 2, or even
P , against D 2 and D i, the Court would have been correct in
allowing the defense of collateral estoppel to D -- in logical effect
an overruling of Glaser.
In light of the above, it becomes necessary to examine the
more recent MacGilfrey and Terwilliger decisions to see if they
shed any light on the effect of Cummings upon the Glaser rule.
In the Terwilliger case, P i's estate had brought an action against
D , and D , and recovered against both. The facts showed that
D 2 was D i's uncle. Upon seeing D , and P 1, her girl friend,
riding in a car with two boys, he followed them. When the boys
got out to talk to D 2, D , frightened, drove off with P, still in
the car. D 2 got in his car and chased them. When their car
crashed, P I was killed and D , injured. In the subsequent action
by D , against D 2, the court refused to allow D 2 to use collateral
estoppel, since it found that the issue of whether D i was negligent
to P 1 was not necessarily identical with the issue of D ,'s negligence
to D 2. For example, D, might have been found negligent in the
first action for failing to warn P , that she would drive off and
for not giving P 1 a chance to leave the car.
The MacGilfrey case presented the same situation in which
P , recovered against D j and D 2, and then D 1 sued D 2. In this
case, however, the court predicated its refusal to allow D 2 to use
collateral estoppel upon the authority of Glaser v. Huette, i.e., D
and D 2 were not adversaries in the prior action. The court noted
that while Cummings "may presage the end of the Glaser rule," 102
that doctrine is still viable.
Upon analysis, it seems that the MacGilfrey court had no
need to decide whether Cummings established the "identity of
issues plus opportunity to be heard" test, even in typical Glaser
situations, since the issue in the prior action may not have been
the same as in the subsequent action; e.g., D 2 could be found not
to have been within D'/s foreseeable, i.e., Palsgraf, zone of danger.
It thus appears that the MacGilfrey court could have based its
holding upon the same rationale as the Terwilliger court, i.e., lack
of identity of issues. While the MacGilfr'ey case is not as clear
cut as Terwilliger, especially since many facts are not given, it
would seem that the cases are essentially the same.
102 MacGilfrey v. Hotaling, 26 App. Div. 2d 977, 978, 276 N.Y.S.2d 850,
852 (3d Dep't 1966).
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Since neither case presented an "identity of issues," the ques-
tion of the effect of Cummings on the Glaser rule would seem to
remain unresolved.
ARTICLE 42- TRIAL BY THE COURT
CPLR 4213(c): Section deemed precatory.
In Allied Scrap & Salvage Corp. v. State,"0 3 the defendant
moved to vacate an award on the ground that the decision was
not rendered within sixty days after the cause was finally sub-
mitted, as provided for in CPLR 4213(c). The court, however,
noted that the provision of CPA § 442,104 providing for a new
trial if the decision were not rendered within sixty days, was
deleted from CPLR 4213(c) "because under the old rule courts
customarily denied the new trial on condition that the decision be
rendered within an additional specified time." ' This deletion,
the court surmised, made CPLR 4213(c) precatory.
Two arguments are advanced for the proposition that 4213
inust be precatory: (1) there is no method of enforcement; and
(2) assuming a means of enforcement, a judge forced to render a
decision will be prone to decide against the moving party. Both
arguments may be answered.
With respect to enforcement, the duty of a judge to render
an opinion is unquestionably a ministerial one. It would seem,
therefore, that a writ of mandamus could issue against a judge
who failed to render a decision within the sixty days provided
for in 4213.106 The court in Allied did not discount such a course
of action. As to the second argument, a decision which smacks
of abuse of discretion can always be appealed.
Thus, it would seem that there is still logical justification for
an interpretation of CPLR 4213 which would find that provision
more than a pious wish.
10326 App. Div. 2d 880, 274 N.Y.S.2d 317 (3d Dep't 1966).
104 Under CPA § 442, a court trying a case without a jury had to render
its decision "wvithin sixty days after the final adjournment of the term where
the issue was tried." Upon failure of the court to do so, either party could
move for a new trial and the court would be obliged to order a new trial
absolutely or order a new trial conditionally upon a decision not being
rendered within a specified time. In practice the section was merely preca-
tory, since the motion for new trial was rarely granted and, instead, the
time for the court's decision was generally extended. 4 WEINSTEIN, KORN
& MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 14213.11 (1966).
10 Allied Scrap & Salvage Corp. v. State, 26 App. Div. 2d 880, 274
N.Y.S.2d 317, 319 (3d Dep't 1966).
106 "[Mandamus] is a proper remedy to compel the performance of a
specific act where the act is ministerial in its character. . . ." 2 BOUVIER,
LAW DICTIONARY 2075 (9th ed. 1914). Seemingly, under CPLR 4213 the
duty would not be subject to mandamus until the sixty days had passed.
